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UNITED STATES V. BEAN1:  SHOVELING AFTER THE ELEPHANT?2
1United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 123 S. Ct. 584, 154 L. Ed. 2d 483, 2002 U.S. Lexis 
9236 (No. 01-704, decided December 10, 2002), reversing 253 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2001), reh. 
den., reh. en banc den., 273 F.3d 1105 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2001) (unpublished table decision), 
judgment vacated and dismissed on remand, Bean v. United States, 322 F. 3d 829 (5th Cir. Feb. 
19, 2003).
2In a case decided after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Bean, the Third Circuit sitting en 
banc reversed its own precedent, Rice v. United States, 68 F.3d 702 (3d Cir. 1995), discussed in 
text at note x, infra. In a concurring opinion expressing frustration with the issues of statutory 
construction raised in the case, Circuit Judge McKee wrote:  “... I find myself identifying with 
the circus hand that our colleague, Judge Aldisert, alluded to while dissenting in United States v. 
Gibbs, 813 F.2d 596, 603 (3rd Cir. 1986) (Aldisert, J. dissenting).  There, Judge Aldisert 
lamented that he ‘would not be the circus hand following the ... elephant around the sawdust 
trail.’  Here, I fear that we have been handed the shovel, and invited to clean up after the 
elephant.  I am joining my colleagues in taking up the shovel.    Given the parameters of the 
jurisprudence so deftly set forth by the majority opinion, I do not think we have a choice.  The 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Bean, and this anomaly will now finally be resolved 
there.”  Pontarelli v. United States, 285 F.3d 216, 238 (3d Cir. 2002), no appellate history.  
Pontarelli is discussed in text at note y, infra.  In Bean, the Supreme Court found no mess by the 
elephant to clean up.
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 Thomas Lamar Bean found trouble south of the Texas border.  A federally licensed 
firearms dealer, Bean attended a 1998 gun show in Laredo, Texas.   While there, Bean and three 
assistants traveled to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico for dinner.  At the border crossing, Mexican 
customs officials found 200 rounds of shotgun ammunition in his Suburban.   The rounds had 
been overlooked by Bean’s assistants during the process of removing firearms and ammunition 
from the Suburban while the group prepared for a casual evening out. Bean was arrested by 
Mexican border agents and charged with felony smuggling under Mexican law.  Following a 
conviction carrying a five-year prison term, and his incarceration for six months in a Mexican 
jail, Bean was returned to the United States under a prisoner exchange program.34 When Bean’s 
supervisory period ended, he filed an application with the United States Secretary of the 
Treasury5 seeking to be relieved of possible federal firearms consequences arising from his 
3253 F.3d at 236.  As a part of the prisoner exchange program, conducted under the 
International Prisoner Transfer Treaty, Bean spent another month in federal prison before being 
released under federal court supervision.  The supervisory period terminated in the summer of 
1999. Id.
4See 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), prohibiting the receipt or possession of firearms and 
ammunition shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by persons convicted of an 
offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year.
5Referred to in this article as the “Secretary.”
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conviction in Mexico.6  His application was returned by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms7 which cited a congressional ban on expending federal funds for investigating or acting 
upon Section 925(c) requests made by individuals.8   Bean then sought relief in federal district 
court, asserting that BATF’s failure to act upon his application acted as a denial of relief under 
Section 925(c).9  The district court agreed with Bean that it had subject matter jurisdiction to 
6The application sought relief under 18 U.S.C. §925(c) (“Section 925(c)”). 
7Referred to in this article as either “BATF” or “ATF.”
8253 F. 3d at 236.  The initial congressional ban on the use by BATF of appropriated 
funds to act upon Section 925(c) applications for relief made no distinction between types of 
applicants.  See Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, 
Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (1992).  Beginning in fiscal year 1994 and following, 
Congress permitted appropriated funds to be used by BATF to investigate corporate applicants. 
See Appendix “A,” infra.  Citations to the relevant appropriation acts are contained in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Bean.  537 U.S. 75, at n. 3.
9Bean v. United States, BATF, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828 (E.D. Tex. 2000), aff’d, United States 
v. Bean, 253 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2001), reh. den., reh. en banc den., 273 F.3d 1105 (5th Cir. Aug. 
21, 2001) (unpublished table decision),  writ granted, 534 U.S. 1112 (2002), rev., 537 U.S. 71,  
123 S. Ct. 584, 154 L. Ed. 2d 483, 2002 U.S. Lexis 9236 (No. 01-704, decided December 10, 
2002),  judgment vacated and dismissed on remand, Bean v. United States, 322 F. 3d 829 (5th 
Cir. Feb. 19, 2003).
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consider Bean’s request.  It also decided that Bean’s administrative remedies from BATF had 
been effectively exhausted or that he was excused from seeking further administrative relief.  
Reaching the merits of Bean’s request after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
ruled that he met the criteria   for receiving relief under Section 925(c).  Accordingly, the district 
court granted Bean’s petition and removed his federal firearms disabilities.10  The United States 
10 Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 840. The district court was also asked by Bean to determine 
whether or not the Mexican conviction could validly constitute a sufficient predicate for 
operation of the federal firearms ban for felons, found at 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).  Citing the 
particular circumstances surrounding the proceedings against Bean in Mexico, the district court 
found that his conviction did not serve as a predicate offense.  89 F. Supp. 2d at 837-38.  
Because that court further found that Bean was entitled to disability relief under Section 925(c), a 
determination upheld by the Fifth Circuit, this question was pretermitted on appeal.  253 F.3d at 
240.   The sufficiency of foreign convictions in general, and of Bean’s in particular, as a 
predicate for Section 922(g)(1) firearms disabilities is beyond the scope of this article.  The 
Supreme Court did not reach the issue, leaving it to be addressed, if at all, by the Fifth Circuit.  
On remand, the Fifth Circuit did not address the question it had previously avoided, and simply 
remanded the case to the district court for entry of an order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.  
Bean v. BATF, 322 F.3d 829 (5th. Cir. Feb. 19, 2003).  The Fifth Circuit did not explain why 
Bean’s plea for declaratory judgment challenging the sufficiency of the Mexican conviction as a 
predicate for the federal firearms ban should also be dismissed for want of jurisdiction together 
with his claim for Section 925(c) relief.
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appealed to the Fifth Circuit, where Bean again prevailed.11  After granting the government’s 
application for review,12 the United States Supreme Court reversed.13
After an overview of the relevant federal firearms statutes as presently constituted, this 
article describes the legislative and decisional background related to the current provisions of 
Title 18, Chapter N of the United States Code at issue in Bean.  It then examines the federal 
appellate decisions interpreting the effect of the BATF funding bans by Congress regarding 
Section 925(c) relief requests.  These background discussions form the basis for a review and 
analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bean.
Part I:  Relevant Provisions of Current Federal Statutes
Federal law14 prohibits specified classifications of persons15 from receiving or possessing 
11Bean, 253 F.3d at 234.
12534 U.S. 1112 (Order dated January 22, 2002). 
13United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 123 S. Ct. 584, 154 L. Ed. 2d 483, 2002 U.S. Lexis 
9236 (No. 01-704, decided December 10, 2002).
1418 U.S.C. Chapter N, consisting of §§921 - 930, contains the most commonly cited 
provisions of federal law establishing criminal penalties with respect to illegal receipt or 
possession of firearms and ammunition that have been shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce.
1518 U.S.C. § 922.  In general, the categories of excluded persons include some, but not 
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most types of firearms16 and ammunition.17   In order to constitute a federal crime, the proscribed 
person’s act of receiving or possession must be of a firearm or ammunition which “has been 
all, felons, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1); fugitives from justice, id., §922(g)(2); illegal drug users or drug 
addicts, id., §922(g)(3); persons adjudicated as mentally ill or committed to a mental institution, 
id., §922(g)(4); illegal aliens or aliens admitted into the United States under a nonimmigrant 
visa, id., §922(g)(5); dishonorably discharged service personnel, id., §922(g)(6); former United 
States citizens who have renounced their citizenship, id., §922(g)(7); persons under court order 
restraining them from committing or threatening to commit acts of domestic violence, id., 
§922(g)(8); and persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, id., §922(g)(9).  
These nine categories are referred to in this article as the “Section 922(g) Exclusions.”
16As defined by federal statute in the context of criminal law, “[t]he term ‘firearm’ means 
(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be 
converted to expel a projectile by the action of any explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any 
such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device.”  The 
term “destructive device” is further defined in the statute to include explosive, incendiary or 
poison gas bombs, grenades, mines, or similar devices.  Antique firearms are expressly excluded 
from the definition of “firearm.”  Id., §921(a)(4).
17
“The term ‘ammunition’ means ammunition or cartridge cases, primers, bullets, or 
propellent powder designed for use in any firearm.”  Id., §921(a)(17(A).
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shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce,” and the act of receiving or possession 
must be “in or affecting commerce.”18  The federal scheme contains a variety of exceptions to 
the general rules, as well as mechanisms to avoid the preclusive effect of those general rules.  
For instance, so-called “white collar” felons convicted of violating state or federal antitrust laws, 
or who have been convicted of offenses pertaining to unfair trade practices, restraints of trade or 
the like, are expressly excluded from the definition of persons having been convicted of a “crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”19  Although the federal law 
1818 U.S.C. §922(g)(last).  For purposes of Chapter N of Title 18 of the United States 
Code, Congress has defined the term “interstate or foreign commerce” to include “commerce 
between any place in a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the 
United States (not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, but such term does not 
include commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside of that 
State.  The term “State” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
and the possessions of the United States (not including the Canal Zone).”  Id., §921(a)(2).  Thus 
it appears that Congress based its power to enact the federal criminal law sanctions concerning 
firearms and ammunition at least in part upon the Interstate Commerce Clause.  U.S. Const., Art. 
I, §8, Cl. 2.  The constitutional underpinnings of Congress’ legislative activity in this area are 
beyond the scope of this article.  The Supreme Court on several occasions has addressed the 
requirement of a nexus between possession, receipt or transportation of a firearm or ammunition, 
and interstate commerce.  See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
1918 U.S.C. §921(a)(20)(A).  The traditional definition of a “felony conviction” as a 
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consequences of such convictions are matters to be determined by federal law, “[w]hat 
constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the 
jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.”20   Not all persons within the ambit of Section 
922(g) remain permanently subject to its sanctions, however, because their federal firearms 
disability is relieved if the conviction has been expunged, set aside or pardoned, or if they have 
had their civil rights restored, unless their pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights 
expressly includes continuation of the firearms prohibitions.21  The pardon, expungement or 
restoration of civil rights must be accomplished under the auspices of the jurisdiction giving rise 
crime being punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year is the predicate for the 
offense of Unlawful Receipt or Possession of a Firearm by a Felon, established in 18 U.S.C. 
§922(g)(1).  Congress has also excluded from the federal firearms and ammunition ban persons 
convicted of “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and 
punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.”  18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20)(B).  Thus a 
misdemeanant convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment for three years would 
be subject to federal firearms disabilities.
2018 U.S.C. §921(a)(20)(first sentence following subsection (B)).
2118 U.S.C. §921(a)(20)(second sentence following subsection (B)).  See also 27 C.F.R. 
§178.142 (titled, Effect of pardons and expunctions of convictions) and §178.143 (titled, Relief 
from disabilities incurred by indictment) (relating solely to licensees and continuation of their 
operations during the term of an indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding 1 year).
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to the conviction or adjudication.22
In addition to the statutory exclusions from the effects of the general rule, Congress has 
provided an after-the-fact relief mechanism for having the federal firearms disability removed.  
Persons adversely affected by Section 922(g) may seek relief of their federal firearms disability 
by applying to the United States Secretary of the Treasury.23  The Secretary may grant relief 
22See Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (1994).  Justice O’Connor wrote the 
opinion for a unanimous Court.  The Court referred to the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. 
§921(a)(20).  The opinion defined the statutory phrase  “[w]hat constitutes a conviction [is] 
determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held, ...” 
as the “choice of law clause,” and the subsequent text, “[a]ny conviction which has been 
expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored 
shall not be considered a conviction ...,” as the “exemption clause.”  511 U.S. at 369.  
Determining that the two clauses must be construed together and should not be read separately, 
the Court held that a state’s restoration of a felon’s civil rights does not remove a disability of 
firearm possession imposed by federal law as a result of a federal conviction.  Id. at 371.  For an 
example of the effect of a gubernatorial pardon of a state felony upon the federal firearm 
disability, see United States v. Matassini, 565 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1978), no appellate history.
2318 U.S.C.§925(c).  Reference to the Secretary of the Treasury includes his delegate.  18 
U.S.C. §921(a)(18).  The Secretary has delegated to the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms his functions, powers and duties under 18 U.S.C. Chapter 44, relating to 
firearms.  See 27 C.F.R. Part 178, §§178.1 et seq.  In this article, a reference to the Director is to 
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from such disabilities “if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the 
disability, and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely 
to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be 
contrary to the public interest.”24  If the requested relief is granted, the Secretary must “promptly 
publish in the Federal Register notice of such action, together with the reasons therefor.”25   In 
the event the Secretary denies the requested relief, the applicant may “file a petition with the 
United States district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial review of such 
denial.”26   In a judicial proceeding invoked by an applicant whose request for relief has been 
denied by the Secretary, the reviewing court “may in its discretion admit additional evidence 
where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.”27  The statute contains no express 
the Director of the BATF.
2418 U.S.C. §925(c).  See 27 C.F.R. §178.144(d).  See also, additional requirements for 
granting relief to persons who have been adjudicated to be a “mental defective” [sic] or 
committed to a mental institution.  Those applicants must have been “subsequently determined 
by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority to have been restored to mental 
competency, to be no longer suffering from a mental disorder, and to have had all rights 
restored.”  27 C.F.R. §178.144(e).
25Id.  See also 27 C.F.R. §178.144(g).
26Id.
27Id. Section 925(c) further provides for suspension of disabilities of licensed dealers and 
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standard of review or scope of review for the district court to apply in considering the action by 
the Secretary denying relief,28 nor is the Administrative Procedure Act29 explicitly referred to in 
connection with the express grant of judicial review. Although the Secretary is expressly 
authorized by statute to adopt administrative rules and regulations related to administration of 
Chapter N, those regulations are limited to “only such rules and regulations as are necessary to 
carry out the provisions of this chapter [Title 18, United States Code, Chapter 44] ...”30
others pending “final action on an application for relief filed pursuant to this section.”  Id.  
Although Bean was at one time a licensee of BATF, his Section 925(c) application apparently 
did not involve his status as such.  Regulation of BATF licensees under 18 U.S.C. Chapter 44 is 
beyond the scope of this article.
28Under traditional principles of administrative law, a reviewing court could evaluate the 
agency action under the substantial evidence standard, or where appropriate by utilizing the 
abuse of discretion standard.   In some circumstances, judicial proceedings following 
administrative actions might involve a trial de novo. An extended discussion of the principles of 
judicial review of agency actions is beyond the scope of this article.  It is sufficient to note here 
that Congress has failed to enact express directives about these matters in the context of Section 
925(c).
295 U.S.C. §§551 et seq.
3018 U.S.C. §926(a)(first).  Before being amended in 1986, Section 926 provided that the 
Secretary “may prescribe rules and regulations as he deems reasonably necessary to carry out the 
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Part 2:  Federal Statutory and Caselaw Background
A review of the relevant federal statutory and caselaw developments related to firearms 
disability and restoration is necessary to a complete understanding of the disputed issues in 
Bean.31  Doing so provides a setting for the legal environment encountered by the courts at the 
provisions of this chapter.”  Public Law 99-308, §106, effective October 22, 1986, significantly 
rewrote the section and added several limitations to the regulatory authority of the Secretary.  
The amendment added the word “only” after the phrase “may prescribe,” and replaced “as he 
deems reasonably” with “as are” in reference to permissible regulations.  Notwithstanding those 
changes, one court has held that the Secretary is not severely restricted in his ability to 
promulgate regulations related to Chapter 44, and the courts must continue to give their 
customary deference to those regulations.  See National Rifle Association v. Brady, 914 F.2d 475 
(4th Cir.), cert. den., 499 U.S. 959 (1990). The Secretary has adopted regulations pertaining to 
applications under Section 925(c) and relief determinations by the Director of BATF as his 
delegate.  See 27 C.F.R. §178.144.
31For additional discussions of the federal legislative background related to firearms, see
Gregory J. Pais, Note, Obtaining Relief from Federal Firearms Disabilities:  Did Congress Really 
Suspend the Relief Available to Felons Through Appropriations Acts?, 23 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 
977, 980 - 83 (Fall, 1998); Ronald C. Griffin, Note, Judicial Review under 18 U.S.C. §925(c):  
Abrogation Through Appropriations?, 76 Wash. U.L.Q. 1095 (1998); Hardy, David T., The 
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act:  A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 Cumb. L. Rev. 585 
(1986 - 1987).  See also, Ryan Laurence Nelson, Rearming Felons:  Federal Jurisdiction under 
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commencement of Congress’ appropriations bans directed at BATF’s processing of Section 
925(c) applications for relief from federal firearms disabilities.
One of the early significant federal firearms legislation was the National Firearms Act of 
1934.32  Under that act, non-payment of federal sales taxes by firearms manufacturers and 
dealers resulted in sanctions, including the prohibition of shipping the subject firearm in 
interstate or foreign commerce and making a federal crime the possession of a firearm that had 
been sold in interstate or foreign commerce without payment of the sales tax.33  The extent of 
federal regulatory activity substantially increased with passage of the Federal Firearms Act in 
1938.34  In addition to providing for the licensing of firearms manufacturers and dealers, certain 
persons were criminally sanctioned from receiving any firearm or ammunition which had been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.35  Congress did not include any 
18 USC § 925(c), 2001 Univ. Chi. Legal Forum 551.
32Chapter 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934), eventually codified into various sections of Title 26 
of the United States Code.
33Id.
3415 U.S.C. §§ 901 - 909 (repealed 1968).
35Before its repeal in 1968, 15 U.S.C. §902(f) provided that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any 
person who has been convicted of a crime of violence or is a fugitive from justice to receive any 
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, 
...”
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mechanism for  relief from this prohibition in its original enactment of the Federal Firearms Act, 
and did not do so until almost three decades later.
In a 1965 amendment to the Federal Firearms Act, Congress added for the first time a 
procedure by which felons could seek to have their federal firearms disabilities removed.36  This 
legislation established an administrative program within the Department of the Treasury.  
Applicants had to satisfy the Secretary that the statutory requisites to relief were met.37  The 
amendment contained no specific provisions either authorizing or precluding judicial review of 
the Secretary’s determinations under the program.  A few years later, Congress enacted the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.38  That same year Congress also enacted 
the Gun Control Act of 1968, which amended several provisions of the newly enacted Safe 
3615 U.S.C. §910 (repealed 1968).
37The Secretary could grant relief if “it was established to his satisfaction that the 
circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant’s record and reputation, were such that 
the applicant would not be likely to conduct his operations in an unlawful manner, and that the 
granting of relief would not be contrary to the public interest.”  Id.
38Section 902, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968), adding Chapter N to Title 18 of 
the United States Code, with particular sections codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 - 28 (hereafter the 
“Safe Streets Act”).  The Safe Streets Act also repealed and recodified various portions of the 
Federal Firearms Act formerly contained in Title 15 of the United States Code, including 
sections 901 through 910.  Safe Streets Act, Section 906.
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Streets Act.39  Fugitives from justice, persons under indictment for an offense punishable by 
more than one year of imprisonment, and persons convicted of an offense punishable by more 
than one year of imprisonment were precluded by the  Safe Streets Act from receiving or 
possessing firearms or ammunition which had been shipped or transported in interstate 
commerce.40  The Safe Streets Act permitted certain felons41 to apply for removal of the federal 
firearms disability, but only for disabilities arising under Chapter N, Title 18 of the United States 
Code.  The firearms disability could not have arisen  from offenses involving the use of a firearm 
or other weapon,  or from a violation of Chapter N or of the National Firearms Act.42  The Gun 
Control Act of 1968 expanded the relief provision by providing that relief could be sought by 
39Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968), amending various sections of Title 18, 
Chapter N, as added by the Safe Streets Act, and adding sections 929 and 930.
40§902, 82 Stat. at 1230-31.
41Curiously, many of the cases and commentaries refer to the disabilities as relating to a 
“convicted felon.”  The term is redundant, because a felon achieves that status only upon 
conviction following either a trial after pleading not guilty, or the entry of a judgment of 
conviction after a plea of no contest or guilty.  Perhaps it would be more accurate to refer to the 
disabilities as affecting an “unpardoned felon.”
42§902, 82 Stat. at 1233.  Fugitives from justice, and persons under indictment for an 
offense punishable by more than one year, thus were not eligible to seek relief under this 
provision.
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some felons for disabilities arising under any provision of federal law, rather than solely those 
arising from a violation of Chapter N.43  Neither the Safe Streets Act nor the Gun Control Act 
contained explicit text either authorizing, or precluding, judicial review of the Secretary’s 
determinations under Section 925(c).
Almost twenty years later, Congress amended Chapter N again, in portions of the 
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986 (“FOPA”).44 FOPA amended Section 925(c) to expand 
the categories of persons eligible to seek relief from their federal firearms disabilities.  Instead of 
being limited solely as a remedy for specified felons,45 an opportunity to seek Section 925(c) 
relief was afforded to any person subject to such disabilities.46  For the first time, Congress also 
made express statutory provision for judicial review of denials of relief by the Secretary.47
Neither the standard of that judicial review, nor its scope, were prescribed.
43§102, 82 Stat. at 1225.  The substantive standard for granting relief also was revised.  
Id.
44Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986).
45That is, felons who had not been convicted of offenses involving the use of a firearm or 
other weapon, or a violation of [Chapter N] or the National Firearms Act.  
46FOPA, Section 105(1)(A), (C).
47FOPA, Section 105(1)(D).  Congress also provided for the admission of additional 
evidence when necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Id.
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The Appendices to this article set out the different versions of Section 925(c) as added or 
amended by these legislative actions.  Appendix A contains Section 925(c) as added by the Safe 
Streets Act of 1968.  Appendix B contains both the previous version of Section 925(c), as added 
by the Safe Streets Act of 1968 and redlined to show additions and deletions, and the “clean” 
version of Section 925(c),  as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968.  Appendix C contains 
both the version of Section 925(c), as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968 and redlined to 
show additions and deletions, and the “clean” version of Section 925(c), as amended by FOPA.  
Appendix D contains a redacted  version of the current expression of Section 925(c), with text 
deleted with respect to matters not at issue in Bean, while Appendix E illustrates the substance of 
the text of the appropriations ban with respect to BATF and its processing of Section 925(c) 
applications.
Several reported cases illustrate the courts’ early efforts to develop a coherent body of 
jurisprudence with respect to the procedural and substantive aspects of judicial review of Section 
925(c) denials48 by the Director before the congressional appropriations ban commenced in 
48That no decision could be found involving a challenge by the government to its own 
executive agency’s determination in favor of an applicant is not surprising.  A scenario in which 
the Director’s favorable grant of Section 925(c) relief would be challenged by judicial review 
initiated by the United States is difficult to imagine.  From that perspective, FOPA Section 
105(1)(D) could be seen as superfluous.  Yet black-letter principles of statutory construction 
counsel against interpretations rendering useless or ineffective language added by the legislature.  
Given the stated purpose of FOPA in making disability relief easier to obtain, Congress’ addition 
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of language expressly providing for judicial review of Section 925(c) denials is most properly 
seen as the addition of a jurisdictional grant independent of that of the APA, or by operation of 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1337.  This understanding does not end the jurisdictional inquiry, however, 
due to the textual reference in the statute, as amended, to courts’ “review” of “denials” by the 
Secretary.  Congress may condition, and often has conditioned, its jurisdictional grants conferred 
upon lower federal courts.  For example, although the federal judicial power extends to cases and 
controversies arising between citizens of different states (diversity jurisdiction), diversity 
jurisdiction is not presently available unless the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.  See 28 
U.S.C. §1332 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-366, §205(a)(1), (a)(2) (1996).  The required 
amount in controversy was $3,000 until 1958, when it was raised to $10,000 (see Pub. L. No. 85-
554, §2 (1958).  It was raised again to $50,000 in 1988.  Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title II, §201(a) 
(1988).  Those same acts of Congress raised the amount in controversy requirement in the 
general federal question jurisdictional grant, contained in 28 U.S.C. §1331, from $3,000 to 
$10,000 in 1958.  The threshold was eliminated with respect to actions brought against the 
United States or any of its agencies in 1976.  Pub. L. No. 94-574, §2 (1976).  It was eliminated 
altogether in 1980.  Pub. L. No. 96-486, §2(a) (1980).  Although the cases are legion involving 
particular case determinations about whether the threshold amounts were satisfied, no substantial 
issue exists about Congress’ expressed intention to condition the jurisdictional grants upon the 
satisfaction of a condition precedent, namely the existence of an amount in controversy 
exceeding a specified sum of money.
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1993.49  Although the methodology and reasoning of these decisions differ in their details, 
several themes are 
discernable.  In the first instance, even without the express provision for judicial review added by 
FOPA, the courts consistently determined that they had subject matter jurisdiction to review 
BATF denials of Section 925(c) relief50.  Secondly, the courts approached their task of reviewing 
49In advancing chronological order, the early cases include:  Kitchens v. United States, 
BATF, 535 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976), no appellate history; Thompson v. United States, BATF, 
533 F. Supp. 90 (Cen. Div. Utah 1981), no appellate history, further proceedings reported at 557 
F. Supp. 158 (Cen. Div. Utah 1982); Bradley v. United States, BATF, 736 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 
1984), no appellate history; Young v. United States, BATF, 690 F. Supp. 990 (SD Ala. 1988), no 
appellate history; In re Porrazzo, 771 F. Supp. 304 (DC Nev. 1991), no appellate history; Smith 
v.United States, BATF, 813 F. Supp. 1382 (DC ED Wis. 1993), no appellate history; Lovell v. 
United States, BATF, 867 F. Supp. 571 (DC WD Mich. 1994), no appellate history; Bagdonas v. 
United States, BATF, 93 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 1996), no appellate history; 
50See, e.g., Kitchens v. United States, BATF, 535 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976), no appellate 
history.  In 1968 Kitchens, a licensed firearms dealer, entered a nolo contendere plea in a 
California state court to a charge of violating state law concerning possession of machine guns.  
In addition to deferral of his sentence, Kitchens was placed on three years’ probation and fined 
$300.  The terms of his probation included a requirement that he comply with all license 
requirements of state and federal law concerning weapons.  After successfully completing the 
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BATF denials  with a substantial deference to the agency’s determinations.  That deference 
continued notwithstanding the addition by FOPA of text51 authorizing a reviewing court to admit 
requirements of his probation, Kitchens  sought an expungement or reduction of his conviction 
pursuant to California law.  He obtained the following relief:  the offense to which Kitchens had 
entered the plea was reduced to a misdemeanor; his plea to the information was withdrawn and 
the information presenting the felony offense was dismissed; and the state court relieved 
Kitchens of all state penalties and disabilities incidental to his plea.  535 F.2d at 1198. Kitchens 
then filed an application with the Director for Section 925(c) relief.  The application was denied 
by BATF on the grounds that “the statutory prerequisites had not been met.”  At that time, 
Section 925(c) contained no express text either authorizing or precluding judicial review of relief 
denials by the Director.  See Appendix B to this article. On appeal, the court found jurisdiction 
for judicial review existed under 28 U.S.C. §1337, which vests district courts with original 
jurisdiction of “any civil action or proceeding arising under an Act of Congress regulating 
commerce ...”  Because the court found the Gun Control Act of 1968 to be a federal statute 
regulating commerce, the court of appeals determined that the federal courts had subject matter 
jurisdiction. 535 F.2d at 1199 and n.5.  See also Thompson v. United States, BATF, 533 F. Supp. 
90, 92 (Cen. Div. Utah 1981), no appellate history, further proceedings reported at 557 F. Supp. 
158 (Cen. Div. Utah 1982).
51FOPA, §105(1)(D).  Given the stated purpose of FOPA in making disability relief 
easier to obtain, Congress’ addition of language expressly providing for the admission by the 
reviewing court seems to have established a type of review independent of, or at least different 
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additional evidence where necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice.  Finally, the result of that 
deferential review routinely52 resulted in decisions upholding the Director’s exercise of 
from, the abuse of discretion standard contained in the APA.  Congress could have, but did not, 
provide for a remand to the Secretary by the reviewing court in such instances, in order to fully 
develop a more adequate administrative record and a possible new or revised determination by 
the agency which would then be subjected to further judicial review.  For example, the Federal 
Alcohol Administration Act, consisting of Chapter 8, Subchapter 1 of Title 27 to the United 
States Code, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., contains a mechanism for remand in appeals from denials 
of permits related to commerce in liquor.  See 27 U.S.C. §204(h).  As discussed in the next
section of this article, the “additional evidence” language was urged by petitioners seeking to 
overcome the congressional appropriations ban as statutory authority to permit a unique type of 
de novo determination by  the district court in its “review” of a “denial” by the Director of BATF 
that had never been made by that agency. 
52See, e.g., Bradley v. United States, BATF, 736 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1984), no appellate 
history. Bradley, a pawnbroker, pled guilty to felony larceny of an automobile in 1958.  After 
receiving a pardon from Arkansas Governor Clinton, Bradley applied with the Director for 
Section 925(c) relief in 1981.  Following an investigation by BATF, his request was denied.  
Bradley’s petition for judicial review also failed to have his federal firearms disabilities relieved.  
The district court disposed of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the 
government and by Bradley.  Citing various circumstances specified in the government’s 
supporting affidavits, the court concluded that “[i]t is apparent from an examination of the entire 
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file that the Director’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious, and was supported by substantial 
evidence.”  736 F.2d at 1239.  Although no jurisdictional predicate is mentioned in the decision, 
the case was decided under the APA.  See the court’s discussion of the standard of review.  736 
F.2d at 1240.  The Eighth Circuit evaluated Bradley’s challenge by determining the proper 
standard of review under the APA.  Because the determination by the Director was the result of 
informal proceedings, that is, the determination was not rulemaking or an adjudication, the court 
held that the agency decision was not reviewable under the substantial evidence test.  Instead, it 
concluded that the “proper standard of review is whether the agency actions are arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  736 F.2d at 1240, 
citing the APA, 5 U.S.C. §706.  The appellate court discussed several principles associated with 
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, such as its being narrow in scope and more 
restrictive than the “substantial evidence” test, the agency finding being subject to rejection 
“only if it is not supportable on any rational basis, and placing upon the complaining party the 
burden of proving that the action was willful and unreasoning, without consideration and in 
disregard of the facts or circumstances of the case.”  736 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted). After 
declaring these principles, on appeal the court found that, “[a]fter a careful examination of the 
record and the reasons given for denial, we agree with the district court that the Director’s 
decision was not arbitrary and capricious and accordingly affirm the decision of the district 
court.”  736 F.2d at 1240, citing the APA, 5 U.S.C. §706.  The appellate court discussed several 
principles associated with the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, such as its being 
narrow in scope and more restrictive than the “substantial evidence” test, the agency finding 
being subject to rejection “only if it is not supportable on any rational basis, and placing upon the 
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discretion.53
Part 3:  The Appellate Courts and the BATF Appropriations Ban
Following the congressional ban against BATF’s use of appropriated funds to investigate 
or act upon applications for Section 925(c) relief by individuals, the focus of appeals from 
dissatisfied applicants shifted from administrative law questions governing the scope of judicial 
review, to the subject matter jurisdiction of federal district courts and the related question of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.  These decisions, summarized in this section, appear in 
complaining party the burden of proving that the action was willful and unreasoning, without 
consideration and in disregard of the facts or circumstances of the case.”  736 F.2d at 1240 
(citations omitted).
53The decisions prior to the appropriations ban acknowledge that the Director’s discretion 
is quite broad but not absolute, for if it were absolute then judicial review would be pointless.  
The opinions further address the need to make probing, searching evaluations of the 
administrative record when determining whether the Director’s decision rested upon any rational 
basis.  So long as the administrative record revealed at least some negative information upon 
which a denial could rationally be made, the courts typically refused to re-weigh that negative 
information against information supporting the granting of relief.  It appears that only Porrozzo, 
discussed in the text at note x, supra, involved a direct reevaluation of the credibility of 
witnesses which led the court to discount negative information.  In that decision only, a lack of 
credible negative information, contrasted with the existence of favorable information, resulted in 
the Director’s decision being overturned as an abuse of discretion.
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the order in which they were reported.
Rice v. United States.54  Rice pled guilty to a Pennsylvania felony involving stolen 
automobile parts.  After learning of the effect of his felony plea upon his firearms privileges, 
Rice applied for Section 925(c) relief from BATF.  During the course of its investigation BATF 
discovered that Rice had committed numerous violations of the federal firearms prohibitions, 
leading to a guilty plea by Rice to federal charges under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).  In February 1992 
Rice was pardoned for his state law convictions and that criminal episode was expunged from his 
state criminal record.  After applying a second time to the BATF for Section 925(c) relief in June 
1992, presumably from the disability remaining from his federal firearms law conviction, Rice 
again failed to succeed.  This time the investigation was terminated by BATF due to the 
congressional funding ban, about which Rice was informed by BATF.55  Rice then sought review 
of BATF’s refusal to grant his June 1992 application.56
5468 F.3d 702 (3d Cir. 1995), no appellate history, overruled en banc by Pontarelli v. 
United States, BATF, 285 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2002), no appellate history.  Pontarelli is discussed 
in text at note z, supra.
5568 F.3d at 705.
56Id.  Rice also raised constitutional issues under the Second Amendment, asserting that 
BATF’s refusal to act denied him his constitutional right to bear arms, and due process and equal 
protection claims under the Fifth Amendment.  Id.  The district court granted the government’s 
motion for summary judgment on these issues, id., and the Third Circuit affirmed the disposition 
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The district court dismissed the application under Section 925(c), concluding that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over [Rice’s] statutory claim for judicial review of BATF’s 
inability to complete the investigation that is a prerequisite to its action granting a convict’s 
section 925(c) application.  The court reasoned that judicial review was unavailable because 
BATF had not finally denied Rice’s application, but simply ”lacked any present means to 
continue processing it.”57  Reversing the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the appellate court remanded the case “to the district court so that it can exercise its 
statutory discretion to decide whether BATF’s failure to grant Rice the relief he seeks would be a 
miscarriage of justice.  If it decides this question in the negative, it should dismiss Rice’s request 
for judicial review on its merits.  If it decides in the affirmative, Rice should be given an 
opportunity to present evidence relevant to section 925(c)’s standards for restoration of firearm 
privileges and thereafter the court should decide the merits of Rice’s case on the completed 
record.”58  Although acknowledging that Congress has constitutional authority to appropriate 
of these issues.  Id. at 706, n. 3.
57Id. at 704.
58Id.  Years later, faced with a strong attack upon Rice, another panel of the Third Circuit 
further explained this procedure.  Rather than determining whether the denial of relief itself 
would create a miscarriage of justice, the question to be determined by the district court was 
whether the applicant’s petition for judicial relief alleged sufficient facts that would indicate a 
potential for a miscarriage of justice and, if so, the applicant would be permitted to submit 
additional evidence on his fitness to have his disabilities removed.  Palma v. United States, 228 
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money and to limit the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts,59 the court noted that, “Before 
courts will hold that Congress has used an appropriation act to repeal substantive legislation or 
preclude judicial review of administrative action, the intention to do so must be clearly stated.”60
Finding that the appropriations ban did not expressly preclude a court from reviewing BATF’s 
refusal to process an application for relief, the court next considered “whether BATF’s inability 
to process Rice’s application is a final denial.  ... This issue is most appropriately analyzed in 
accord with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.”61  Applying the typical 
balancing test used in exhaustion analysis,62 the court found the balance tipped in favor of 
proceeding with Rice’s application.  One of the crucial weights in the balance was the FOPA 
F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2000), no appellate history.  Because Palma’s alleged need to possess firearms 
on its face failed to demonstrate the potential for a miscarriage of justice, the appellate court held 
that the district court erred in granting him relief under Section 925(c) and ordered it to dismiss 
the application.  228 F.3d at 331.  The government’s challenges to Rice, while noted, thus were 
not reached due to the court’s disposition on the merits.  228 F.3d at 329.
59Id. at 706 (citations omitted).
60Id. at 706 - 07 (citation omitted).
61Id. at 707.
62Id.  The balancing test weighs the “interest of the individual in retaining prompt access 
to a federal judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).
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amendment permitting the introduction of additional evidence to avoid a miscarriage of justice:  
“Were it not for the express authority section 925(c) gives district courts to receive independent 
evidence when necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice, we would be hesitant to excuse 
exhaustion where, as here, Congress has entrusted a decision to an agency under standards 
including one so broad as ensuring the public interest.”63  In the event that Rice was permitted to
introduce additional evidence, the district court was ordered to “decide, on the basis of all the 
evidence before it, whether Rice has met his burden of showing he ‘will not be likely to act in a 
manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the 
public interest.”64  In contrast to the earlier opinions discussed in Section 2 of this article, the 
district court thus was directed to make its own decision upon the merits as to whether a Section 
63Id. at 708 - 09.  This provision, the court reasoned, “gave the district courts discretion to 
create or supplement the administrative record when necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice.  
What further part the agency should play in the ongoing court proceedings if the district court 
decides that it is necessary to receive independent evidence as to whether Rice has become fit for 
relief from his firearms disability is not presently before us.  In that respect the record is not yet 
complete.  We note, however, that the relevant provisions of the appropriation acts do not seem 
to preclude the agency from presenting its views on the propriety of granting Rice’s application 
on the record created in a judicial forum.”  Id. at 709.
64Id.
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925(c) applicant satisfied the statutory requirements for relief from firearms disabilities.65
United States v. McGill.66  McGill’s guilty pleas in 1993 to two federal felony offenses67
triggered the federal firearms disabilities created by Section 922(g)(1).  Following his early 
release from probation in September 1994, McGill filed an application for Section 925(c) relief 
with BATF.  Citing the congressional appropriations ban, BATF advised McGill that it was no 
longer accepting such applications.  McGill’s attempt to secure judicial relief was dismissed on 
the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.68  The dismissal was affirmed on appeal, but on 
different grounds.  The jurisdictional issue69 was pretermitted because it was “clear to [the Fifth 
65The court commented upon several aspects of the case that might be relevant to the 
merits of Rice’s claim for relief, and concluded those comments with a reminder that “the 
Supreme Court has held that the right to possess a firearm after a disabling conviction is a 
privilege, not a right.  Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L. Ed. 2d 198 
(1980).  Thus, Rice bears a heavy burden in his attempt to support his statutory claim.”  68 F.3d 
at 709.
6674 F.3d 64 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 821 (1996).
67The two offenses were making a false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1014, and 
filing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206.  74 F.3d at 65.
68Id.
69
“Although we doubt that the district court has original jurisdiction to consider an 
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Circuit panel] that Congress suspended the relief provided by §925(c).”70  Whether the 
appropriations ban effected a suspension of the relief available under Section 925(c) was said to 
turn on the intent of Congress.71  In its effort to ascertain that intent, the court reviewed both the 
textual evolution of the appropriations ban72 and the Senate report by the Appropriations 
Committee accompanying the 1993 Appropriations Act.73  After that review, it was clear to the 
panel “that Congress intended to suspend the relief provided by § 925(c).  We cannot conceive 
that Congress intended to transfer the burden and responsibility of investigating the applicant’s 
fitness to possess firearms from the ATF to the federal courts, which do not have the manpower 
application to remove the Federal firearm disability, ...:  Id.
70Id.
71Id.
72The court noted that the 1992 appropriations ban originally extended to BATF’s 
processing of any Section 925(c) applications, but was modified in 1993 and 1994 to expressly 
permit the processing of such applications filed by corporations.  Id. at 66.  “If Congress thought 
the courts were considering applications for relief under § 925(c), this restoration of funds to 
provide relief for corporations would have been unnecessary.”  Id. at 67.
73Id.  That report was summarized by the court as expressing concerns over:  “(1) use of 
limited valuable resources for investigating these difficult cases and (2) consequences to 
innocent citizens if ATF makes a mistake and grants relief to a felon from his firearm 
disabilities.”  Id.
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or expertise to investigate or evaluate these applications.”74  Disagreeing with the contrary 
conclusion in Rice,75 the court concluded that “relief from federal firearms disabilities for 
individuals under § 925(c) [was] suspended by the last three appropriations acts.”76
Accordingly, the dismissal below was affirmed, on the basis that the relief under Section 925(c) 
was suspended rather than on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.77
Burtch v. United States, BATF.78  Burtch’s four felony convictions between 1984 and 
1987 resulted in his being subject to federal firearms disabilities under Section 922(g)(1).  His 
application to BATF for Section 925(c) relief, filed in January 1994, was returned unprocessed 
by BATF with a letter citing the congressional funding ban.  In response to Burtch’s petition for 
74Id. at 67.
75Id.  The court focused on the conclusion in Rice that the appropriations ban did not 
expressly repeal Section 925(c) nor expressly preclude judicial review of BATF’s refusal to 
grant relief from firearms disabilities.  Id.
76Id.
77Id.  By leaving open the jurisdictional question, McGill presented an opportunity for the 
panel in Bean to distinguish the prior decision on the basis of the passage of time, recasting the 
then short-term suspension involved in McGill to a seemingly permanent attempt by Congress to 
repeal the remedy in an appropriations context without expressly repealing the statute.
78120 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1997), no appellate history.
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judicial relief, the district court dismissed the action for want of subject matter jurisdiction, 
holding that, “‘where no investigation occurs, there is no denial.’”79  In analyzing the 
jurisdictional issue, the appellate court relied upon the express terms of the statute, which states 
that judicial review occurs in reference to a “denial” by BATF of an application for relief.  The 
court stated that ‘[t]he statute is so clear that we hold it means what is says.  Thus, the failure to 
appropriate investigatory funds should be interpreted as a suspension of that part of section 
925(c) which is affected.”80  Declining to find that the ability to supplement the administrative 
record with additional evidence in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice permits a reviewing 
court to “build a record from scratch or make discretionary policy determinations in the first 
instance if the Secretary does not,”81 the court construed the term “denial” by the Secretary to 
mean “an adverse determination on the merits and does not include a refusal to act.”82  Because 
the court found a clear intention by Congress to suspend the ability of the BATF to act upon, and 
thus deny, a Section 925(c) application, and the existence of a denial is a jurisdictional predicate 
for judicial review, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s review of the 
79Id. at 1089, quoting the ruling by the district court.  “Burtch also challenged as an equal 
protection violation the appropriation statutes’ distinction between individuals, who are not 
permitted to have their applications processed by ATF, and corporations, which are.”  Id.




legislative history underlying the appropriations ban.  It also declined to follow the Third 
Circuit’s holding in Rice that subject matter jurisdiction existed under Section 925(c) even in the 
absence of a denial of relief by BATF.83  Also unlike the Fifth Circuit, the dismissal below on the 
grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction was expressly affirmed.84
Owen v. United States, BATF.85  Due to his felony convictions in 1993 on two counts of 
filing false tax returns, Owen became subject to federal firearms disabilities by operation of 
Section 922(g)(1).  After completion of his prison term, Owen applied to BATF for relief under 
Section 925(c).  As in the previous cases, the Director advised him that the application could not 
83Id.  The court also easily disposed of Burtch’s equal protection claims.  Burtch agreed 
that his challenge should be assessed under the “rational basis” standard.  This in turn meant that, 
in “areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along 
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal 
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a 
rational basis for the classification.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Because “Congress could rationally 
have believed that corporations guilty of corporate crimes present less danger to the community 
than do individual felons,” id., the equal protection challenge failed.  Burtch apparently did not 
argue that he had an individual right to own and bear firearms under the Second Amendment, 
which if true would subject the classification scheme to “strict scrutiny.”
84Id.
85122 F.3d 1350 (10th Cir. 1997), no appellate history.
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be processed due to the then-continuing congressional appropriations ban.86  The district court 
dismissed the ensuing lawsuit filed by Owen under Section 925(c) on the basis of lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.87  In a variation to the issue as phrased in the earlier cases, the question on 
appeal was said to be “whether the district court had jurisdiction to review the refusal of the 
BATF to investigate or act on an application for relief from the denial of firearms privileges to a 
convicted felon on the ground that Congress had, through appropriations statues, provided that 
none of the funds appropriated thereby are available for investigating or acting on such 
applications.”88  Not surprisingly, Owen urged the Tenth Circuit to follow Rice rather than 
McGill or Burtch.  The court followed the ultimate holding in Burtch, that “in the absence of a 
denial by the BATF of an application by Owen for relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §925(c), the 
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed.”89  Unlike the Ninth 
Circuit, the court in Owen followed the Fifth Circuit’s reference to legislative history in aiding its 
86Id. at 1351.
87Id. at 1352.
88Id.  The court noted the differing opinions on the jurisdictional question contained in 
Rice, McGill, and Burtch.  Id.  It then provided a summary of the background and holding of 
those cases.  Id. at 1352 - 54.
89Id. at 1354.
Page -34-
statutory construction of what might only superficially appear to be a statute clear on its face.90
In view of that legislative history, the court stated that “[t]o infer that Congress intended to 
transfer this important and subjective task to the courts simply flies in the face of Congress’ 
statements.  The BATF has the requisite manpower and expertise for making this determination, 
while the courts do not.”91
Saccacio v. United States, BATF.92  After his conviction for the federal felony of making 
a false statement to a federal agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001, Saccacio became subject to 
federal firearms disabilities under Section 922(g)(1).93  His application for Section 925(c) relief, 
filed in 1998, was returned by the BATF which informed him it could not act upon it, due to the 
appropriations ban.  Saccacio’s petition for judicial review was denied for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit cited Burtch for the proposition that the word 
“denial” means “an adverse determination on the merits,” rather than merely  “a refusal to act.”94
90Id. and at id., n.1.
91Id., citing McGill, supra, 74 F.3d at 67.
92211 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 2000), no appellate history.
93Id. at 103, n.1.
94Id. at 104.  In dictum, the court also explained its view that a contention that BATF’s 
failure to act constituted a “constructive denial” of the application, although not argued by 
Saccacio, also would have failed to win a reversal.
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Therefore, “because section 925(c) authorizes judicial review of only the denial of an application 
for relief, and the ATF’s failure to process Saccacio’s application during the less than six-month 
period prior to his filing of this action in district court is not the denial of an application, the 
district court correctly concluded that it was without subject-matter jurisdiction.”95  In the only 
substantive law footnote in the opinion, Rice was said to have only held that Section 925(c) “is a 
judicially waivable exhaustion requirement, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite.  In so 
holding, that court was not obliged to – and did not – construe the ‘denial of application’ 
language of section 925(c), which we only construe here.”96
McHugh v. United States, BATF.97  McHugh was convicted under New York law of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,98 and thus became subject to the federal firearms 
disabilities established by Section 922(g)(1).  When BATF, citing the appropriations ban, did not 
act upon his Section 925(c) application, filed in June 1998, McHugh filed suit in federal district 
court seeking either an order of mandamus compelling action by the BATF upon his application, 
or in the alternative a trial de novo on the application by the court.  The trial court denied the 
government’s motion to dismiss.  On appeal, the court reversed and held that no basis existed for 
95Id., citing Owen, Burtch, and McGill.
96Id. at n.2.  The Caccacio court failed to address the discussion by the court in Rice
concerning the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court.
97220 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2000), no appellate history.
98Defined in 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(33)(A).
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an order of mandamus, and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
application for Section 925(c) relief.99  The requested relief of mandamus was easily disposed of, 
because the court refused to order the agency to perform an act (investigate and act upon the 
application) that was expressly prohibited by law in the appropriations ban.100 Regarding the 
request for the district court to act upon the application notwithstanding the absence of an 
express denial of relief by the Director, the court reasoned that “Section 925(c) makes an agency 
‘denial’ of an application a predicate to district court jurisdiction, and no such denial has been 
issued here.”101  The court laid out three justifications for its holding.  First, it noted that Section 
925(c) “was not written so as to create a freestanding opportunity for relief from federal firearms 
disabilities which might be vindicated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 or 1337, which establish 
original district court jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions and congressional 
commerce regulations, respectively.  Rather, the statute states that a person ‘may make 
application to the Secretary’ and ‘the Secretary may grant such relief.’ 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).”102
Second, the standard for granting relief is phrased broadly in terms of a determination of what is 
99220 F.3d at 55.
100Id. at 57 - 58.
101Id. at 59.  The court declined to follow the view expressed in Rice that the issue of 




in the “public interest,” a matter the court believed to be best left for administrative agencies 
rather than the courts.103  Third, the court concluded that the statutory language for admission of 
new evidence is a restriction on the power of the courts, rather than a grant of additional judicial 
authority, and “suggests that the initial adjudication of applications is limited to the Secretary of 
the Treasury.”104The Second Circuit cited as favorable authority Saccacio, Owen, Burtch, and 
McGill, and declined to follow Rice and the reported decision by the district court in Bean.105
Mullis v. United States.106  A 1994 felony conviction for falsifying business travel 
expenses subjected Mullis to firearms disability under Section 922(g)(1).  He sought twice to 
remove that disability under Section 925(c).  His first attempt, in October 1996, resulted in no 
action by BATF due to the appropriations ban.  When Mullis subsequently petitioned for Section 
103Id.
104Id.  at 59 - 60.
105Id.  In dictum, the court stated that even if the BATF’s failure to act, in view of the 
congressional appropriations ban, amounted to a “de facto denial” of the application, such a 
denial would not be arbitrary or capricious, as required by the applicable standard of review 
under Section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act.  Id. at 61, citing Bagdonas, 
McGill and Bradley.
106230 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2000), no appellate history.
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925(c) judicial relief, his request was denied without prejudice.107  Mullis again wrote the ATF in 
October 1997, and was again told that the agency was not accepting applications. His second 
petition for judicial relief was referred to a magistrate judge, notwithstanding the objection to 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction made by the United States.  The district court adopted the 
magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendations favorable to Mullis, and the government 
appealed.108
In response to the jurisdictional objections, Mullis argued that the appropriations ban 
prevented BATF from acting without altering the judiciary’s role in making Section 925(c) 
determinations.  After canvassing the previous circuit court decisions in Rice, McHugh, Owen, 
Burtch, and McGill, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit “that the satue [sic, statute] 
contemplates judicial review of the discretion exercised by the Secretary in denying an 
application, not independent discretion exercised in a de novo review of an application.”109  After 
107Id. at 216.  The trial court stated that Mullis could reapply after exhausting his 
remedies “by submitting an application made pursuant to § 925(c) to the ATF at least two years 
after the termination of his probation.”   The trial court’s order appears to have taken into 
consideration 27 C.F.R.§ 178.144(d), which states that the “Director will not ordinarily grant 
relief if the applicant has not been discharged from parole or probation for a period of at least 2 
years.”
108230 F.3d at 217.
109Id. at 219.
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noting that the statute established only a mechanism of judicial review of the underlying agency 
determination, under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court also examined the 
“practicalities” of the federal judiciary conducting an appropriate background examination, and 
concluded that federal courts were ill equipped to perform this function.110  As additional support 
of its conclusion, the court stated that “the legislative history [of the appropriations bans] only 
serves to further reinforce the conclusion that Congress did not intend to modify § 925(c) to 
permit de novo judicial review of applications for the reinstatement of firearm privileges.”111
Therefore, the court concluded, “Congress, through its appropriations act, has chosen to at least 
temporarily suspend the operation of § 925(c) in its entirety, thereby removing subject matter 
jurisdiction from the district court.”112
Bean v. United States, BATF.113  The background facts in Bean were discussed earlier in 
110Id. at 220.
111Id.  “Given this history, it is unreasonable to believe that Congress intended that 
federal courts devote their judicial resources to consider – on a more limited record than that 
before the ATF – the weighty question of whether a felon’s firearm rights should be restored.”  
Id. at 220 - 21.
112Id. at 221.
113United States v. Bean, 253 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2001), reh. den., reh. en banc den., 273 
F.3d 1105 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2001) (unpublished table decision), writ granted, 534 U.S. 1112 
(2002), reversed,  U.S. , 2002 U.S. Lexis 9236 (Slip Opinion December 10, 2002).
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this article.114  Following its introductory comments of the issues involved in the case, the Fifth 
Circuit first addressed the issue of jurisdiction and its prior decision in McGill.  “In McGill we 
noted that Congress, through its appropriations acts, had reflected an intent to suspend the relief 
provided to individuals by § 925(c).  As a consequence we opined that we lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.”115  The court expressed doubts about the utility of looking to floor comments by 
members of Congress or to committee reports.  Instead, the court examined the statutory history 
of the actions ultimately taken, or not taken, by Congress in its quest to determine the legislative 
intent underlying the appropriations ban.116  That statutory review began with a recognition that 
the amendment by FOPA to Section 925(c) was intended by Congress “to provide for judicial 
review of executive decisions in order to better ensure that relief was available for those felons 
whose convictions were based on technical or unintentional violations.”117  Also significant to 
114See text accompanying notes x through y, supra.
115Id. at 237.
116Id.  “We do not here parse the committee or floor commentary but, rather, examine 
congressional action / inaction and its continuing effect.”  Id.  McGill was considered “in light 
of, notably, the intervening passage of time and its effect.”  Id.
117Id.  That observation, grounded upon Congress’s express statements of purpose and 
findings in FOPA, appears to be the only appellate recognition that the changes made by FOPA 
were intended to change the law, at least in part, pronounced by the decisions predating the 
amendments, by broadening the availability of relief to applicants under Section 925(c).
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the court was the failure of Congress to pass the SAFE bill, or any other legislation expressly 
repealing or amending Section 925(c).118 While acknowledging that Congress appears to have 
both created statutory rights but has also indirectly abrogated those rights by prohibiting 
expenditures to enforce them, the court found “that action clearly distinguishable from the facts 
in [cited cases]119 and inimical to our constitutional system of justice.”120
Apart from what it found to be distinguishable aspects of Bean’s circumstances from 
those involved in previous cases, the court pointed to what it characterized as a
Critical additional factor, the intervening passage of time and the resulting reality 
of the effective non-temporary ‘suspension’ of statutorily created rights.  We must 
conclude that Congress seeks to abrogate administrative and judicial rights it 
created, by using funding bills, after declining to address actual amendments to or 
revocation of the creating statute.  Section 925(c) was enacted for apparently valid 
reasons, and citizens like Bean are entitled to the rights therein created and 
authorized unless and until Congress determines to change same.  We must now 
conclude that merely refusing to allow the agency responsible for facilitating 
those rights to use appropriated funds to do its job under the statute is not the 
requisite direct and definite suspension or repeal of the subject rights.  We further 
hold that when the BATF notified Bean that it would not act on his petition, his 
118Id.  The SAFE bill (an acronym for Stop Arming Felons) is discussed in more detail in 
the following text of this article examining the Pontarelli decision by the Third Circuit.
119The court reviewed earlier cases, such as Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 
U.S. 429 (1992), United States v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 
437 U.S. 153 (1978), United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (19uu), and United States v. Dickerson, 
310 U.S. 554 (1940).
120253 F.3d at 239.  No authority was cited for this conclusion.
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administrative remedies de facto were exhausted.121
Pontarelli v. United States, BATF.122  The final court of appeals to consider the effect of 
the appropriations ban, after the Fifth Circuit opinion but before the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Bean, was also the first one to do so, in Rice.  Pontarelli was convicted of bribery, a 
federal felony, in 1991, and among other penalties was sentenced to three years of probation.  
His 1998 application to BATF under Section 925(c) was not acted upon by the BATF, which 
cited the appropriations ban.  Pontarelli’s petition for judicial relief was granted, and the 
government appealed.  The Third Circuit heard the case en banc to reconsider Rice.123  Following 
a critical review of that earlier decision, the en banc court overruled Rice and held that the trial 
court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review Pontarelli’s application.”124  That holding was 
based upon the court’s determination of congressional intent from the structure of the statute as 
directly impacted by the appropriations ban.125  In dictum, the court also considered the 
121Id.
122285 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2002), no appellate history.
123Id. at 219.  An earlier panel of the Third Circuit, while noting the government’s attack 
on Rice, denied relief on the merits.  See Palma, discussed in note 58, supra.
124Id. at 218.
125Id. at 226:  “The texts of § 925(c) and the appropriations ban demonstrate convincingly 
that Congress did not intend for district courts to review individual felons’ § 925(c) applications 
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legislative history of the appropriations ban, finding the history supportive of a congressional 
intent to suspend judicial relief under Section 925(c).126   As additional support for its holding, 
the court examined the policy aspects of a contrary decision, and stated in further dictum that  
“[d]istrict courts’ institutional limitations suggest that Congress could not have intended for the 
appropriations ban to transfer to them the primary responsibility for determining whether to 
restore felons’ firearms privileges.”127
Judge McKee “reluctantly” concurred with the judgment of the court.128  He wrote his 
opinion “to express my concerns over the more fundamental issue confronting us, and because I 
think this case is more momentous than the majority’s analysis and the weight of the aggregate 
authority suggest.”129  He formulated the issue, as “whether Congress’s failure to appropriate 
in the first instance.”  Footnote omitted.
126Id. at 226 - 30.
127Id. at 230 - 31.  The decision in Bean was said to have “ignored the texts of § 925(c) 
and the appropriations ban, departed from Supreme Court precedent on when an appropriations 
act can change a substantive statute, and distorted the legislative history of the appropriations 
ban.”  Id. at 218, n. 4.
128Id. at 231.
129Id. at 231.  Although Judge McKee was certain that Congress wanted to suspend 
felons’ ability to obtain Section 925(c) relief, he was “not nearly as certain that Congress actually 
suspended those privileges as opposed to merely having created a situation that leaves the 
Page -44-
funds for the investigation mandated by § 925(c) was tantamount to rescinding subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts even though the statute conferring that jurisdiction was neither 
amended nor formally repealed.”130  Judge McGee reviewed the complex factual, legislative and 
judicial history involved in the TVA decision,131 In Judge McGee’s view, “[t]he primary issue 
facing the Supreme Court [in TVA] on appeal from the court of appeals’ decision granting an 
injunction was whether Congress’s continued funding of the project under these unique 
circumstances implied the repeal or amendment of the Endangered Species Act as applied to the 
Tellico project.”132  After referring to the Supreme Court’s statement that the doctrine 
jurisdictional grant in place while making its exercise absolutely impossible.  In this latter 
situation, courts have no alternative but to conclude that subject matter jurisdiction under § 
925(c) is an impossibility and the statute therefore becomes a dead letter.  There is a fine but 
important distinction between concluding that Congress intended to repeal a statute that confers 
subject matter jurisdiction, and concluding that it is impossible to exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction because the condition precedent to its exercise can never be satisfied although the 
grant of jurisdiction remains.  Moreover, to the extent that the latter formulation of the issue 
necessarily implies the former, I write to express my concern that courts are being forced to 
repeal legislation that Congress has intentionally decided to leave alone.”  Id. at 232.
130Id. at 233.
131Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
132Id. at 236. 
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disfavoring repeals by implication “‘applies with even greater force when the claimed repeal 
rests solely on an Appropriations Act,’”133 Judge McGee also pointed to the Court’s observation 
“that the appropriations legislation that Congress approved for the project did not specifically 
state that the Tellico project was to be completed ‘irrespective of the requirements of the 
Endangered Species Act.’”134
Because of the duration of the repeated annual  “suspension” of relief under Section 
925(c),135 and Congress’s failure to pass plainly substantive legislation explicitly repealing or 
modifying Section 925(c),136 Judge McGee opined that the “courts are forced to read the tea   
133Id., citing TVA, supra, 437 U.S. at 190.
134Id., citing TVA, supra, 437 U.S. at 189.  Unlike the situation in TVA, Congress made a 
specific reference to Section 925(c) in the appropriations ban.  See Appendix D to this article.
135Judge McGee expressed discomfort “with the notion that Congress can grant subject 
matter jurisdiction on the one hand while indefinitely suspending it on the other without altering 
the text of the jurisdictional statute.”  285 F.3d at 237.
136Opponents of the relief mechanism afforded by Section 925(c) introduced the SAFE 
bill, an acronym for the Stop Arming Felons Act.  It failed to pass.  The majority in Patronelli
characterized the appropriations ban as a political compromise providing for annual, temporary 
suspension of relief in lieu of the proposed full repeal of Section 925(c).  285 F.3d at 223.  The 
SAFE bill was reviewed in detail by the majority, as was the history of various legislative battles 
within the appropriations context.  Id. at 228 - 30.  “That Congress chose not to repeal § 925(c)’s 
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leaves sprinkled about the legislative history, and divine a resolution for the irreconcilable 
tension remaining between the continuing grant of a substantive privilege, and the failure to fund 
the mechanism for its realization.  I agree that, given the nature of the statutory problem, we are 
unable to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under § 925(c).”137  Noting that the Supreme Court 
had granted review of the decision by the Fifth Circuit in Bean, Judge McGee expressed his hope 
that “this anomaly will now finally be resolved there.”138
As Bean made its way to the Supreme Court, the weight of appellate authority was that 
the appropriations ban effectively eliminated both the ability of BATF to investigate and act 
upon requests for relief, and also the availability of district court relief for dissatisfied applicants.  
Although the ultimate rationale for the decisions varied, recurring themes and principles emerge.  
Notwithstanding a lack of uniformity of application, settled authorities were repeatedly invoked.  
The following discussion summarizes principles consistently referred to in the appellate court 
decisions evaluating the effects of the appropriations ban, with citations to typical authority 
supporting the propositions.139
relief provision does not mean that it did not intend to suspend it.”  Id. at 229.
137Id. at 238.
138Id.
139These settled principles are not, in and of themselves, particularly difficult to 
understand.  Like many areas of the law, the difficulty lies in the application of the principles to a 
particular case, rather than development of new rules to fill gaps in existing law.  Citations are 
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Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, absent constitutional 
boundaries imposed upon those courts and the Congress, are subject to congressional limits upon 
their jurisdiction.140  Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate federal funds,141 and to 
both authorize and prohibit their being expended for specified purposes.142   Unless constitutional 
rights are involved, Congress can preclude or condition judicial review of administrative agency 
action, or inaction.143   District courts typically lack jurisdiction to entertain challenges to 
administrative proceedings unless agency processes have been exhausted or exhaustion is 
solely to representative Supreme Court decisions.
140See, e.g., Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (“There can be no 
question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts 
of the United States.”)(footnote omitted).  Those limits may neither be disregarded nor evaded.  
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).  Congress’ authority is broad, 
and it may “give, withhold or restrict ... jurisdiction at its discretion ...”  Kline v. Burke Const. 
Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).  Conversely, absent circumstances in which abstention is 
appropriate, the district courts cannot decline to exercise jurisdiction conferred upon them by 
Congress.  citation
141See U.S. Const., Art. I, §8.
142Federal funds may not be spent absent their appropriation by act of Congress.  See, 
e.g., OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
143See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 672-73.
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excused.144  Legislation may explicitly, or implicitly, repeal, amend or suspend other substantive 
law.   Congress may use appropriation acts to affect substantive law, as long as it does so 
clearly.145  Implied repeals, suspensions or amendments of substantive law are particularly 
144See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (50-51 (1938).  The 
exhaustion of remedies doctrine is “one among related doctrines – including abstention, finality, 
and ripeness – that govern the timing of federal court decisionmaking.”  McCarthy v. Madigan, 
503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).  Exhaustion “serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative 
agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.”  Id. at 145.    In deciding exhaustion issues, 
federal courts “must balance the interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal 
judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.”  Id. at 146.  
Circumstances factoring into the balance include the effect of requiring exhaustion upon later 
court action, substantial questions about whether the agency is empowered to grant effective 
relief, and the presence of agency bias or predisposition of the question.  Id. at 148.  Other 
factors include the exercise of agency discretion and expertise.  Each case must be examined in 
its particular context.  Id.  Where “Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required.”  Id. 
at 144.    However, if “a statutory requirement of exhaustion is not explicit, ‘courts are guided by 
congressional intent in determining whether application of the doctrine [of exhaustion] would be 
consistent with the statutory scheme.’”  Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and 
Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 579 (1981) (quoting Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 
496, n.4 (1982).
145See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992); United States, v. 
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disfavored in the context of appropriation acts.146
Because the starting point in statutory construction is the determination of congressional 
intent, the inquiry focuses first upon the actual language selected by Congress to be included in 
the statute or statutes in question.  Legislative history, at least in some circumstances, may be 
useful in construing the meaning of statutes but should be cautiously considered.147
Except for Rice and Bean, application of these principles led the appellate courts to 
conclude that the statutory structure of Section 925(c) vests the granting or denial of relief in the 
first instance solely to the Director as the designee of the Secretary.148  In their view, federal 
Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980); United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940).  
146See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).  No formulaic language 
is required.  Instead, a “positive repugnancy” between the existing statute and the appropriations 
statute is sufficient to indicate repeal or suspension of the earlier statute.  Id. at 190.
147In construing a statute, “the legislative history is not to be ignored even though we feel 
that the ‘legislative intent is clearly manifested in the language of the statute itself.’  Train v. 
Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10.  “When aid to construction of the 
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ 
which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination.’”  Train, 
426 U.S. at 10, quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 
(1940).
148See, e.g., Owen, 122 F.3d at 1354 (“The only role for the judiciary is judicial review of 
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district courts are relegated under Section 925(c) solely to reviews of “actual denials” of relief by 
the Director, and BATF’s compliance with the appropriations ban is not the equivalent of an 
actual denial that authorizes judicial review.149 From their perspective, the standards authorizing 
the granting of relief reflect considerations best determined by agency action on behalf of the 
executive branch of the federal government and not by the federal judiciary.  Evaluating this 
aspect from a practical perspective, the majority courts concluded that BATF, in contrast to the 
judiciary, has the staffing and expertise necessary to investigate applications and to properly 
a denial of relief under § 925(c) to restore firearms privileges.”).
149See, e.g., Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090 (“In the context of the entire statute, the word 
“denial” means an adverse determination on the merits and does not include a refusal to act.”); 
Owen, 122 F.3d at 1354 (“We hold that in light of the absence of a denial by the BATF of an 
application by Owen for relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §925(c), the district court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed.”); Saccacio, 211 F.3d at 104 (“We conclude that the 
jurisdictional requirement of section 925(c) is not satisfied merely by the ATF’s failure to 
process Saccacio’s application.  As the Ninth Circuit has held, we believe that, as used in section 
925(c), ‘the word “denial” means an adverse determination on the merits,’ rather than merely ‘a 
refusal to act.’”) (citation to Burtch omitted); McHugh, 220 F.3d at 61 (“We are nonetheless 
persuaded by the contrary view that the word ‘denial’ connotes more than a mere refusal to 
act.”); Mullis, 230 F.3d at 219 (“We agree with the Second Circuit that the statute contemplates 
judicial review of the discretion exercised by the Secretary in denying an application, not 
independent judicial discretion exercised in a de novo review of an application.”).
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evaluate whether Section 925(c) relief should be granted.150  The ability of a reviewing court to 
admit additional evidence to avoid a miscarriage of justice does not, for the majority, confer 
upon district courts de novo jurisdiction to determine applications absent BATF’s actual denial 
of relief.151 The legislative history of the appropriations ban is claimed to support of the 
150See, e.g., McGill, 74 F.3d at 67 (“We cannot conceive that Congress intended to 
transfer the burden and responsibility of investigating the applicant’s fitness to possess firearms 
from the ATF to the federal courts, which do not have the manpower or expertise to investigate 
or evaluate these applications.”); Owen, 122 F.3d at 1354 (“To infer that Congress intended to 
transfer this important and subjective task to the courts simply flies in the face of Congress’ 
statements.  The BATF has the requisite manpower and expertise for making this determination, 
while the courts do not.”); McHugh, 220 F.3d at 59 (“Second, the standard for granting relief is 
worded so broadly as to connote administrative agency decisionmaking. ... Administrative 
agencies are far better suited than are courts to make determinations based on the broad policy 
question of what is in the ‘public interest.’”);
151See, e.g., McGill, 74 F.3d at 67 (“Even though § 925(c) allows the district court to 
admit additional evidence in extraordinary circumstances, the legislative history of this 
amendment makes it clear that Congress intended for district courts to review only the 
Secretary’s denial under an arbitrary and capricious standard.”); McHugh, 220 F.3d at 59 
(“Third, § 925(c) contains a restriction on the consideration of new evidence by the district 
courts, stating:  ...This constraint on the admission of evidence suggests that the initial 
adjudication of applications is limited to the Secretary of the Treasury.”)(In a footnote, the court 
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conclusion that Congress intended to suspend the program in its entirety rather than to reallocate 
resources from BATF to the courts.152  As a part of that history, the lifting of the appropriations 
ban for agency investigations and determinations of relief applications for corporations indicates 
refers to legislative history of FOPA, then states that “Congress’s cautious attitude toward 
plenary district court review suggests that § 925(c) does indeed state a limit on district court 
jurisdiction to consider in the first instance applications for relief from federal firearms 
disabilities.  220 F.3d at 60, n. 4); Mullis, 230 F.3d at 219 (“Even if there were any doubt 
concerning Congress’ intent, the practicalities of conducting the requisite investigation only 
serve to reinforce the conclusion that Congress intended to suspend § 925(c)’s operation. ... the 
court would only be able to conduct a very one sided inquiry, relying largely on letters of 
recommendation and testimony from individuals hand selected by an applicant.  Unlike the ATF, 
the court cannot canvas the circle of neighbors and acquaintances who may have negative 
information concerning such things as the applicant’s tendency toward violence or use of drugs 
and alcohol.  These institutional disadvantages make it highly unlikely that Congress intended 
district court to review an applicant’s dangerousness to society in the first instance.  Nor would 
the costs to the courts in making an investigation be less than the costs to the ATF.  They might 
well be greater since there would be no investigation or testimony by trained agents for the court 
to rely on.”)
152See, e.g., McGill, 74 F.3d at 67 (“By withdrawing funds to the ATF to process these 
applications under these circumstances and with this explanation by the appropriations 
committee, it is clear to us that Congress intended to suspend the relief provided by § 925(c).”); 
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that Congress intended to continue to deny Section 925(c) relief for individuals.153
Part 4: The Supreme Court and the Appropriations Ban
As viewed by the Supreme Court,154 the issue before it was “whether, despite 
appropriation provisions barring [ATF] from acting on applications for relief from firearms 
disabilities of persons convicted of a felony, a federal district court has authority under [Section 
925(c)] to grant such relief.”155  Following a brief discussion of the factual and procedural 
history of the case,156 Justice Thomas summarized the key statutes involved and traced the basic 
history of the appropriations ban.  Disagreeing with Bean’s contention that ATF’s failure to act, 
due to the appropriations ban, constitutes a “denial” within the meaning of Section 925(c), the 
Court held that “an actual decision by ATF on an application is a prerequisite for judicial review, 
and that mere inaction by ATF does not invest a district court with independent jurisdiction to act 
153See, e.g., McGill, 74 F.3d at 67 (“We also find the history of funding for investigating 
applications from corporations as evidence of the intent of Congress to suspend the relief 
available under § 925(c). ... If Congress thought the courts were considering applications for 
relief under § 925(c), this restoration of funds to provide relief for corporations would have been 
unnecessary.”); 
154Justice Thomas wrote for a unanimous Court.
155537 U.S. at 72.
156Id. at 72-73.
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on an application.”157   That holding was grounded on grammatical and policy considerations.
First reviewing the statute from a grammatical perspective, the Court construed the 
phrase in the statute “denied by the Secretary” to refer to the Secretary’s decision on the merits, 
which in turn revolves upon his determination of whether an applicant “will be likely to act in a 
manner dangerous to public safety” and whether “the granting of the relief would not be contrary 
to the public interest.”158  The opinion observes that the Secretary’s determination could “hardly 
be construed as anything but a decision actually denying the application.”159
The three-step procedure contained within Section 925(c) also persuaded the Court “that 
157Id. at 76.
158Id.  The Court also noted that the APA distinguishes between an agency’s “denial” of 
relief and its “failure to act” with respect to a request for relief.  Id. at 76,  n.4.  Judicial review is 
available only in the case of a denial, id., in contrast to a failure to act, in which an applicant’s 
remedy lies under 5 U.S.C. §706(1), involving a proceeding to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”  Id. at 75, n.2.  Secondary authority was cited in 
support of the conclusion drawn from the use by Congress of different words within the APA for 
occasions in which an applicant for relief was unsuccessful before an agency.  “The use of 
different words within related statutes generally implies that different meanings were intended.”  
Id. at 76, n.4, citing 2A  N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §46.06, p. 
194 (6th ed. 2000).
159Id. at 76.
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an actual adverse action on the application by ATF is a prerequisite for judicial review.”160
Because the standard of judicial review is not specified under Section 925(c), the Court first 
noted that the APA provides for an “arbitrary and capricious action” standard.161  Applying that 
standard in the context of judicial review of Section 925(c) proceedings “indicates that judicial 
review is predicated upon ATF’s dispositive decision:  the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ test in its 
nature contemplates review of some action by another entity, rather than initial judgment of the 
court itself.”162
Analysis of the statutory grounds for granting of relief formed the second source of 
support for the Court’s conclusion.  The task of predicting whether an applicant “is likely to act 
in a manner dangerous to public safety” was said to presuppose “an inquiry into that applicant’s 
background – a function best performed by the Executive, which, unlike courts, is institutionally 
equipped for conducting a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.”163  The other prong of the 
standard, requiring a determination of whether “the granting of the relief would not be contrary 
to the public interest,” was found by the Court to require “an inherently policy-based decision 
160Id.  These steps involve the filing of an application, action by the Secretary granting or 
denying the application, and judicial review of a denial.  Id.




best left in the hands of an agency.”164
As a third basis of support for its reading of the statutory scheme, the Court observed that 
additional evidence could be admitted only in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.  
“Congressional assignment of such a circumscribed role to a district court shows that the statute 
contemplates that a district court’s determination will heavily rely on the record and the decision 
made by ATF.  Indeed, the very use in §925(c) of the word ‘review’ to describe a district court’s 
responsibility in this statutory scheme signifies that a district court cannot grant relief on its own, 
absent an antecedent actual denial by ATF.”165
By virtue of its grammatical and structural analysis of the statute and the procedural 
framework it creates, the Court ultimately held “that the absence of an actual denial of 
respondent’s petition by ATF precludes judicial review under §925(c), and therefore [we] 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.”166   Neither the published Slip Opinion nor the 
decision as bound in the reporters ordered the case remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider 
the unaddressed issue of whether the foreign felony conviction, in Bean’s particular 





167This question had been pretermitted by the Court of Appeals.  See discussion of this 
Page -57-
This decision is noteworthy both for what it reveals about the Court’s method of statutory 
construction and also for what it indicates the Court finds as the appropriate allocation of policy-
based functions between the Executive and the Judiciary.  Other than the decision of the 
appellate court below, the Supreme Court cites no decisional law in its opinion.  It does not 
mention, much less reaffirm, black-letter principles of statutory construction, such as the search 
for congressional intent, the impact of ambiguity or the role of legislative history.  The Court 
fails to delve into the subtleties of the debates in Congress related to the appropriations bans, or 
the partial repeal of the appropriations bans as they relate to applications for relief by 
corporations.168  Nor does the Court explore the implications of the amendments to Section 
925(c) introduced by FOPA, including the expressed intention to make Section 925(c) relief 
more readily available to persons who have committed technical violations of law.  None of the 
other appellate decisions addressing the significance of the appropriations ban are mentioned.  
No concern is expressed about suspension, amendments or repeal of substantive legislation by 
implication, especially in the context of appropriations statutes.  Instead, the Court turns solely to 
a grammatical and structural analysis of the statute in order to reach its holding.   Each prong of 
the Supreme Court’s analysis is open to criticism.
Grammatically, the antecedent of the phrase “denied by the Secretary” is the application 
issue at n. 10, supra.
168The opinion cites the various appropriations bans and notes that they affect 
applications by individuals, but does not mention that BATF is not barred from processing 
applications made by corporations.  537 U.S. at 75 and n.3.
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for relief from disabilities filed by any person.  The phrase does not, as posited by the Supreme 
Court, reference the necessary predicates for the Secretary’s granting of relief, that is, the “public 
safety” and “public interest” requirements.  Statutory interpretations focusing on the meaning of 
a specific word or phrase typically look to several principles, none of which were cited in the 
opinion.169  For instance, one canon of construction calls for words to be given their ordinary and 
common meaning and understanding, in the absence of a particular statutory definition or where 
the context of the statute clearly requires a different meaning.170  Chapter N of Title 18 of the 
United States Code does not provide an express definition of the word “denied.”  Thus it would 
not be unusual for a court to consult prior decisions, or outside authority such as Black’s Law 
Dictionary.171   Another grammatical aid leads a court to define one word or phrase by 
169Like most general rules, canons of statutory construction are means to an end, and not 
ends in and of themselves.  Thus, they “need not be conclusive and are often countered, of 
course, by some maxim pointing in a different direction.”  Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 
U.S. 106, 116 (2001).
170See, e.g., Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 537 U.S. 393,402 (2003).  But see Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) (“We give the words of a statute their ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning, absent an indication that Congress intended them to bear some different 
import ...” (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
171A search on Lexis on September 21, 2003 reveals more than one hundred seventy 
citations to Black’s Law Dictionary by the Supreme Court.
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contrasting and comparing it with another word or phrase elsewhere in the statute being 
reviewed.172  This technique would have pointed the Court to the last sentence of Section 925(c), 
requiring that whenever the Secretary “grants relief to any person pursuant to this section he 
shall promptly publish in the Federal Register notice of such action, together with the reasons 
therefor.”173  Thus the statute itself contemplates only two actions by the Secretary when 
processing an application:  relief is either granted or relief is denied. Seen in contrast to one 
another, interpreting the word “denial” in opposition to a “granting” of relief would have 
buttressed the grammatical analysis engaged in by the Court.  If the Court had pursued these 
avenues of inquiry, it might have determined that the seemingly plain phrase, “denied by the 
Secretary,” might benefit from further analysis.
Statements by the Court about the substantive grounds for relief, and the respective roles 
of the Executive and the Judiciary, would significantly erode the role of judicial review in 
Section 925(c) proceedings, if they again become funded by Congress.  For instance, the statute 
requires the Director to determine whether an applicant “is likely to act in a manner dangerous to 
the public safety ...”  In order to make that determination, the Court correctly anticipates that a 
background inquiry is required.  With no analysis or empirical data to support its assertion that 
such an inquiry is “a function best performed by the Executive,” the courts are said not to be 
172For a case in which the Supreme Court engages in extensive parsing of a portion of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, see NLRB v. Ky. Riv. Comty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
173Section 925(c).
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“institutionally equipped for conducting a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.”174  This assertion 
is questionable in several respects.  First, within the context of a judicial proceeding under 
Section 925(c), the district court is not, itself, the entity conducting the investigation.  Instead, 
the traditional adversarial process is operative, and seems more than adequate to produce 
appropriate information upon which the court may base its policy decisions.  Second, the 
Supreme Court’s presumption that the Executive’s inquiry will necessarily be “neutral” ignores 
the circumstance that the agency performing the investigation is charged with law enforcement 
responsibilities.  It is naive to believe that political influences, coupled with a predisposition to 
“keep guns out of the hands of felons” will not, at least from time to time, factor into the 
investigative process.  Nothing in the enabling regulation entitles the applicant to have access to 
the investigative information produced following the filing of an application for relief.  The 
applicant is not expressly authorized to participate in investigative interviews, or to cross 
examine persons providing information during the investigation.  Rank hearsay and 
unsubstantiated “feelings” or “hunches” by neighbors and coworkers also may make their way 
into a report.
If, as stated by the Court, a determination of whether “the granting of the relief would not 
be contrary to the public interest” is indeed “an inherently policy-based decision best left in the 
hands of an agency,”175 then reviewing courts have extremely limited roles to play in judicial 
review of such agency decisions.  The statute contains no procedure for remand by a reviewing 
174537 U.S. at 77.
175Id.
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court that determines the Director has abused his discretion, leaving to the reviewing court the 
ultimate responsibility to decide the validity of the application’s merits.  Courts routinely decide 
matters involving weighty issues affecting the public interest, and no principled reasons exist to 
presume that the courts cannot effectively act within the subjective requirements of Section 
925(c).176  Furthermore, the FOPA amendment permitting the admission of additional evidence if 
necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice indicates that Congress has afforded the courts with 
the evidentiary resources needed to make that decision, in contrast to limiting their decisions to 
matters shown by the record below.
Addressing that amendment by FOPA, the Court characterized a reviewing court’s role as 
being “circumscribed” by Congress.177  Until that amendment, however, reviewing courts 
consistently held that their review was limited to the administrative record, and in some circuits 
review was limited to the stated reasons expressed by the Director for the denial.  Given the 
congressionally stated purpose of FOPA to broaden the availability of relief under Section 
925(c), the amendment serves as a type of “relief valve” when the investigative processes of the 
agency have been inadequate, or when circumstances have materially changed following the 
completion of the investigation.  Because the threshold of allowing additional evidence is the 
avoidance of a miscarriage of justice, a reviewing court would be able to admit evidence that is 
176The disputed 2000 presidential election, the Microsoft antitrust case, and numerous 
abortion rights decisions are readily cited examples of matters affecting the public interest 
decided by federal courts.
177Id.
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favorable, and also unfavorable, to the request in order to avoid injustice.  Seen in the light of 
FOPA, the role of the judiciary in Section 925(c) proceedings is plenary, rather than 
circumscribed.
Part 5: Conclusion
Taken together, the Court’s policy rationales announced in support of its decision in Bean
evidence an unwillingness to enter the politically sensitive arena of fashioning remedies for 
worthy applicants, while optimally utilizing scarce public resources and avoiding the appearance 
of improperly “putting guns back into the hands of felons.”  The policy statements were not 
necessary to the decision, in view of the Court’s evaluation of the grammatical structure of 
Section 925(c).  Congressional suspension of Section 925(c) by successive appropriation acts 
was not seen as a mess by an elephant that needed shoveling by the nation’s highest court.  
Instead, the Court failed to see evidence that an elephant had passed through at all.178
178In one sense, the issue is now settled so long as the annual appropriations ban remains 
in place.  The Director may continue to “not act” on applications due to the appropriations ban, 
and the substantive relief tantalizingly held out by Section 925(c) will remain beyond the grasp 
of applicants.  Congress should consider the substantive requirements for granting relief, and 
revisit the question of the classifications of persons eligible to seek relief under the statute.  
Many avenues of change suggest themselves.  Persons convicted of violent crimes, with or 
without the use of firearms, might be excluded.  Applicants might be required to wait a specified 
time period after their federal firearms disability arises before seeking relief, in order to provide a 
sufficient time for a post-disability record of “clean” conduct to occur, thus aiding an inference 
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of the absence of future danger to the public.  Finally, a successful applicant might be required to 




As added by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §925(c) 
originally read as follows:
A person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year (other than a crime involving the use of a firearm or 
other weapon or a violation of this chapter or of the National Firearms Act) may 
make application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities under this chapter 
incurred by reason of such conviction, and the Secretary may grant such relief if it 
is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction, 
and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be 
likely to conduct his operations in an unlawful manner, and that the granting of 
the relief  would not be contrary to the public interest.  A licensee conducting 
operations under this chapter, who makes application for relief from the 
disabilities incurred under this chapter by reason of such a conviction, shall not be 
barred by such conviction from further operations under his license pending final 
action on an application for relief filed pursuant to this section.  Whenever the 
Secretary grants relief to any person pursuant to this section he shall promptly 




The following redline marking show the amendments to 18 U.S.C. §925(c) made by the 
Gun Control Act of 1968.  Bracketed text indicates where the changes occurred, with additions 
being underlined and overstrike font identifying deletions.
A person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year (other than a crime involving the use of a firearm or 
other weapon or a violation of this chapter or of the National Firearms Act) may 
make application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities [under this 
chapter] [imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, 
transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms and] incurred by reason of such 
conviction, and the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his 
satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant’s 
record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to [conduct his 
operations in an unlawful manner,] [act in a manner dangerous to public safety
and that the granting of the relief  would not be contrary to the public interest.  A 
[licensee] [licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed 
collector] conducting operations under this chapter, who makes application for 
relief from the disabilities incurred under this chapter by reason of such a 
conviction, shall not be barred by such conviction from further operations under 
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his license pending final action on an application for relief filed pursuant to this 
section.  Whenever the Secretary grants relief to any person pursuant to this 
section he shall promptly publish in the Federal Register notice of such action, 
together with the reasons therefor.
After removing the redline markings showing the amendments to 18 U.S.C. §925(c) made by the 
Gun Control Act of 1968, Section 925(c) provided as follows:
A person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year (other than a crime involving the use of a firearm or 
other weapon or a violation of this chapter or of the National Firearms Act) may 
make application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by 
Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or 
possession of firearms and incurred by reason of such conviction, and the 
Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the 
circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant’s record and reputation, 
are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to 
public safety and that the granting of the relief  would not be contrary to the 
public interest.  A licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or 
licensed collector conducting operations under this chapter, who makes 
application for relief from the disabilities incurred under this chapter by reason of 
such a conviction, shall not be barred by such conviction from further operations 
under his license pending final action on an application for relief filed pursuant to 
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this section.  Whenever the Secretary grants relief to any person pursuant to this 
section he shall promptly publish in the Federal Register notice of such action, 
together with the reasons therefor.
APPENDIX “C’
The following redline marking show the amendments to 18 U.S.C. §925(c) made by the 
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, enacted in 1986.  Bracketed text indicates where the changes 
occurred, with additions being underlined and overstrike font identifying deletions.
A person who [has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year (other than a crime involving the use of a firearm or 
other weapon or a violation of this chapter or of the National Firearms Act)] [is 
prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or 
ammunition] may make application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities 
imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, 
shipment, [transportation] or possession of firearms [and incurred by reason of 
such conviction], and the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his 
satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant’s 
record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a 
manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief  would not be 
contrary to the public interest.  [Any person whose application for relief from 
disabilities is denied by the Secretary may file a petition with the United States 
district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial review of such 
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denial.  The court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to 
do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.]  A licensed importer, licensed 
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector conducting operations under 
this chapter, who makes application for relief from the disabilities incurred under 
this chapter by reason of such a conviction, shall not be barred by such conviction 
from further operations under his license pending final action on an application 
for relief filed pursuant to this section.  Whenever the Secretary grants relief to 
any person pursuant to this section he shall promptly publish in the Federal 
Register notice of such action, together with the reasons therefor.
After removing the redline markings showing the amendments to 18 U.S.C. §925(c) made by the 
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Section 925(c) provided as follows:
A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving 
firearms or ammunition may make application to the Secretary for relief from the 
disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, 
transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms, and the Secretary may grant such 
relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the 
conviction, and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the applicant 
will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the 
granting of the relief  would not be contrary to the public interest.  Any person 
whose application for relief from disabilities is denied by the Secretary may file a 
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petition with the United States district court for the district in which he resides for 
a judicial review of such denial.  The court may in its discretion admit additional 
evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.  A 
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector 
conducting operations under this chapter, who makes application for relief from 
the disabilities incurred under this chapter by reason of such a conviction, shall 
not be barred by such conviction from further operations under his license 
pending final action on an application for relief filed pursuant to this section.  
Whenever the Secretary grants relief to any person pursuant to this section he 




The current version of Section 925(c), redacted to delete text not relevant to the matters at 
issue in Bean, reads as follows:
A person who is prohibited from possessing, ... firearms or ammunition may make 
application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal 
laws with respect to the ... possession of firearms, and the Secretary may grant 
such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding 
the conviction, and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the 
applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that 
the granting of the relief  would not be contrary to the public interest.  Any person 
whose application for relief from disabilities is denied by the Secretary may file a 
petition with the United States district court for the district in which he resides for 
a judicial review of such denial.  The court may in its discretion admit additional 
evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.  ...
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EXHIBIT “E”
The texts of the various appropriations bans after Fiscal Year 1992 read substantially as 
follows:
Provided further, That none of the funds appropriated herein [for the BATF] shall 
be available to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal 
firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 925(c); Provided further, That such funds 
shall be available to investigate and act upon applications filed by corporations for 
relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 925(c): ...
